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This essay is a response to the (March 2000) Physics Today Opinion article “Quantum Theory
Needs No Interpretation” by Fuchs and Peres. It was written several years ago and has been
collecting electronic dust ever since Physics Today said they weren’t interested in it. We post it
here with the hope that it may still be of some interest.
In recent years the debate on these ideas has
reopened, and there are some who question
what they call “the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics” – as if there existed
more than one possible interpretation of the
theory. —Rudolf Peierls1
Some such remark is the first blow of a one-two combi-
nation that often constitutes the entirety of what physics
students are taught about the foundations of quantum
mechanics. In case any recalcitrant youngster happens to
inquire about one of the verboten interpretations, there
is always the second blow: That interpretation is merely
philosophical bias, and therefore no part of physics. In-
deed, Peierls’ above remark occurs in a section which
begins with his account of reactionary philosophical ob-
jections to relativity and quantum theory.
Peierls reiterates this idea in a sequel volume: “I
have discussed the interpretation of quantum mechanics
and emphasized that there is no alternative to the stan-
dard view that the wave function (or more generally the
density matrix) represents our knowledge of a physical
system.”2
This is surely a commonplace characterization of quan-
tum mechanics. But we should not gloss over how rad-
ical a philosophic statement it is: the central dynamical
object of the theory, the wave function, is said to refer
exclusively to a human mind and not any physical system
external to that mind.
Our objection conerns not primarily the content of this
view, although we strongly disagree with it. The prob-
lem is instead the rather preposterous notion that this
interpretation is uniquely unburdened by any prior philo-
sophical world-view.
We believe this same inconsistency lies at the core of
the Opinion article authored by Chris Fuchs and Asher
Peres.3 They present what they claim is an uncontrover-
sial, bare-bones “interpretation without interpretation”
of quantum theory that, they assert, is perfectly consis-
tent and free of the extraneous metaphysical concepts
other interpretations attach to the theory. They write,
for example, that “encumbering quantum mechanics with
hidden variables, multiple worlds, consistency rules, or
spontaneous collapse, without any improvement in its
predictive power, only gives the illusion of a better un-
derstanding.”
Yet, like Peierls, what Fuchs and Peres (FP) present
as an alternative is simply a different but equally philo-
sophic view involving unsupported metaphysical – in-
deed, fundamentally anti-scientific – assumptions.
—–
In their essay, FP state repeatedly that quantum the-
ory is internally consistent; this is the reason they dis-
miss all attempts to “encumber” quantum theory with a
physical interpretation. “[T]o make quantum mechanics
a useful guide to the phenomena around us,” they write,
“we need nothing more than the fully consistent theory
we already have. Quantum theory needs no ‘interpreta-
tion’.”
But is quantum theory internally consistent? To all
appearances, the answer is: No. The theory contains,
side by side, two mutually inconsistent recipes for the
time evolution of the wave function: normal unitary time
evolution according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and the
wave function collapse process which is supposed to occur
when a measurement is made. The apparent inconsis-
tency between these rules is the major manifestation of a
long-standing difficulty called the measurement problem.
Resolving, removing, or explaining it away is part of
providing an interpretation of quantum theory. This typ-
ically involves clarifying the exact meaning of “measure-
ment” by giving some account of the primitive ontology
of the theory: which objects in the formalism represent
objective physical entities and properties, and which rep-
resent merely our (perhaps limited) knowledge thereof.
Why is the measurement problem a problem at all?
Why not just say that particles act differently depend-
ing on whether or not a measurement is being made?
This would certainly resolve the contradiction (by show-
ing that the two rules don’t apply at the same time) but
it comes at a great cost: the “unprofessionally vague and
ambiguous”4 concept of measurement would then play a
2fundamental role in physics, as if “being observed” and
“not being observed” were a physical distinction on the
same level as, say, the distinction between fermions and
bosons. But what precisely is a measurement and how
is it distinguished from a non-measurement? Moreoever,
how could nature possibly care enough about this human
activity to stop her unitary evolution in deference to it?
Something more is therefore needed. If we don’t think
that concepts naming uniquely human activities belong
in our fundamental physical theories, then we had bet-
ter look elsewhere for a resolution of the measurement
problem. Many different proposals have been made, in-
cluding the many worlds and consistent histories inter-
pretations alluded to by FP. We will focus, however, on
Bohm’s hidden variable theory5 as an example of the the-
oretical cash value of a realist interpretation of quantum
mechanics. We will then compare Bohm’s theory to the
“interpretation without interpretation” offered by FP.
In any hidden variable theory, the measurement prob-
lem is resolved by supplementing the QM description of
the system’s physical state (the wave function) with addi-
tional variables describing objective facts not contained
in the wave function itself. For example, the deBroglie-
Bohm (dBB) theory supplements the standard quantum
description of a particle’s state with a description of the
actual position of the particle within the wave.
Both wave and particle are regarded as real, physical
objects. The wave function evolves in time according to
Schro¨dinger’s equation, while the particle’s trajectory is










where ~v is the velocity of the particle. (The general-
ization to an N -particle state and/or to particles with
spin is straightforward and natural.) Thus the point-
like scintillations seen in the double-slit experiment, and
measurement results generally, represent the positions of
the actual particles themselves, and Equation (1) can be
shown6 to imply consistency between the probability dis-
tribution associated with these particles and that defined
by |ψ|2.
Granting real, physical existence to at least some ob-
jects of the theory in this way has a number of positive
effects. Primarily, it solves the measurement problem
quantitatively and unambiguously. There is no longer
any mystery of how measurements end with definite re-
sults. Thus, there is no longer any need for a separate
postulate about the collapse of the wave function when
a “measurement” occurs. Rather, a theorem is derived
regarding the effectively irreversible behavior of highly
entangled wave functions associated with the introduc-
tion of many additional degrees of freedom describing a
measurement apparatus (which, in dBB, is simply an-
other ordinary physical object in the universe).
This works because the wave function need be consid-
ered only insofar as it affects the particles. If the wave
function splits into a number of distinct and indepen-
dently evolving packets in configuration space (which is
guaranteed under certain well-defined conditions by the
decoherence effect), then the particles are influenced only
by the one packet in which they actually reside. The
particles behave as if all the other packets have been col-
lapsed away, but without any need to postulate a non-
unitary, Schro¨dinger-violating collapse process.
An additional attractive aspect of dBB is that these
particles can now be viewed as primary physical objects,
just like in classical physics, giving us an intuitive phys-
ical picture of even the most complicated many body
quantum processes. This is in fact a good thing, despite
the abundant philosophical antagonism directed against
it over the last century.
The dBB theory is thus a major step toward profes-
sionalism and precision in the foundations of quantum
mechanics. Fuchs and Peres, however, are quick to dis-
miss dBB and the other interpretations mentioned above
on the grounds that they are unnecessarily encumbered
with philosophical concepts. What do they offer in place
of these interpretations?
They offer a series of radical philosophic statements
regarding the meaning of the wave function: it is “only
a mathematical expression for evaluating probabilities”;
contradictions arise from “attributing reality to quantum
states”; “no wavefunction exists either before or after we
conduct an experiment”; “the wavefunction is not an ob-
jective entity”; “collapse is something that happens in
our description of the system, not to the system itself”;
“the time dependence of the wavefunction does not rep-
resent the evolution of a physical system.”
The idea of the wave function as nothing but a means
of computing probabilities immediately raises the ques-
tion: probabilities of what? FP do not believe that these
are probabilities of real subatomic events, e.g., the stan-
dard proposition that |ψ(x)|2 represents the probability
of detecting a particle to be at x. That would be a re-
version to micro-physical realism, in which an electron is
assumed capable of being at all – just the kind of thing
FP pointedly dismiss as a wrong-headed attempt to “cre-
ate a new theory with features that correspond to some
reality independent of our potential experiments.”
Instead, FP’s answer is that the probabilities calcu-
lated in quantum theory refer only to macroscopic events.
But this simply places a different name on the same am-
biguity that had previously been shuffled under the idea
of “measurement.” Where exactly is the cut between
micro- and macroscopic, and why should such a cut en-
ter into the fundamental laws of physics? If one elec-
tron is not objectively real, and two electrons are not
objectively real, why should a collection of 1023 electrons
be real? Things like temperature and elasticity may be
emergent properties, but surely existence as such is not.
Nothing real can emerge from that which doesn’t exist.
Like the proposed divide between measurement and non-
measurement, an artificial cut between micro- and macro-
worlds simply does not belong in the fundamental laws
3of nature.
To FP, however, this is not a problem, because they
hold a gravely epistemic view of the quantum world. For
them, the wave function – which is to say the entire con-
tent of conventional quantum theory – refers to some-
thing mental, not something in external reality. They
do attempt to provide a hedge by admitting that “the
possible existence of an objective reality independent of
what observers perceive” cannot be excluded in princi-
ple. Still, even if there is an objective reality, they argue,
it is unimportant in practice for “using the theory and
understanding its nature.”
This sort of radical anti-realism can resolve interpreta-
tive paradoxes in virtually any context, and it has been
attempted before. For example, Mach’s rejection of the
need to ground “pressure” and “temperature” in terms of
real microscopic entities obviates the subsequent puzzles
associated with thermodynamic equilibrium and the con-
vergence to it. This does not, however, appear to be good
evidence against the reality of atoms. More broadly, the
philosophical doctrine of solipsism can “solve” every dif-
ficult problem in the history of science by simply denying
that anything but the advocate’s own mental experiences
exist. This, however, is infinitely distant from the kind
of solution we are interested in as scientists.
—–
Alan Sokal once described the motivation for his fa-
mous prank as follows: “What concerns me is the prolif-
eration not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se,
but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking:
one that denies the existence of objective realities, or
(when challenged) admits their existence but downplays
their practical relevance.”7 Sokal was, of course, referring
to the depths of irrationality to which some fields in the
humanities and social sciences have descended.
It is frightening that the same anti-realism Sokal
ridiculed there can be put forward as a supposedly natu-
ral and uncontroversial interpretation of quantum theory.
It is even more frightening that this anti-realism is glibly
passed off as non-philosophical, for this suggests not only
that many physicists have accepted a fundamentally anti-
scientific set of philosophical ideas but that, in addition,
they have done so unwittingly.
Does the community of physicists – those individuals
whose lives are dedicated to observing, understanding,
and learning to control the physical world – really accept
as solid, hard-nosed science the idea (hedged or not) that
there is no physical world – that, instead, it’s all in our
minds?
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